



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

NEW BOOKS REVIEWED

THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN GERMANY. By WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914.

It may as well be said at once that Mr. Dawson's excellent description and analysis of the exceedingly rapid progress made by Germany since 1871 throws little direct light upon the causes of the great struggle now raging in Europe. In fact, the author, in common with other calm-minded observers, seems to have regarded any plunge into warfare by the Germans as in the highest degree unlikely. "No wilful disturbance of the world's peace," he wrote, "need be apprehended from them, for the economic conquests upon which their mind is set can only be achieved by peaceful methods, and this they know far better than some of the rivals whose trade they are capturing." It was the desire of the German tax-payer, he supposed, simply to *have*, rather than to *use*, the Empire's vast army and formidable navy. On the other hand, it is true that Germany has been facing a very serious problem due to the enormous increase of her population. So great, indeed, has been this increase that the German authority is called conservative who estimated that by the year 1925 the population of the Empire would be eighty millions, or nearly twice what it was when Bismarck declared that territorial expansion had gone far enough. Nor is Germany by any means self-supporting. Statistics show that during the years from 1895 to 1900 the corn-growers of the country were able to supply only 92.6 per cent. of the nation's needs in rye, and 73.7 per cent. in wheat and spelt. During more recent years Germany has had to import from one and three-quarters to two million tons of wheat, while the deficit in rye averaged nearly half a million tons in the years 1902-1905. Yet for this disproportion between the growth of population and the increase of production no permanent relief is to be found, maintains Mr. Dawson, in mere extension of Germany's European boundaries. "Whatever reality there may be in the ideals and efforts of the Pan-Germanic movement," he says emphatically, "Pan-Germanism offers no solution of this population problem." The real remedies are, in his opinion, either the creation of colonies affording outlets for such population as cannot be maintained at home, or the acquisition of new markets which shall be able to receive an enormously increased industrial output in exchange for food.

At some future time it may be that we shall attain to a full understanding of the motives which animated the several European nations participating in the present conflict; it is not easy to deduce these from anything that the economists and political scientists have told us thus far. On the other hand, those who have permitted themselves to generalize about the national temper of various peoples have given us impressions that seem to

be at least in part confirmed. Mr. Dawson generalizes cautiously, but he knows how to put his impressions into vivid and accurate language. The spirit of Germany, he points out, has undergone a complete change since the days when Goethe and Schiller, Kant and Fichte, were its prophets; and the outcome of this change he sums up in the expression "force-worship." In politics, literature, architecture, everywhere, this newer spirit has been at work. "Wherever one looks in Germany at the present day one sees the assertion, on a grandiose scale, of an endeavor after sheer mastery—in the struggle with natural forces which has been carried on with such wonderful perseverance and deserved success, in the strengthening of the imperialistic spirit, in the irresistible advance of industry and commerce, in the striving after an inviolable military power, in the eager and jealous glances which are now being turned to the sea. In all these things the underlying thought is the thought of *subdual*, and subdual is the spirit of modern Germany, now in the first blush of a new life, its capacities still but partially developed, its resources but partially discovered."

Of course it would be as absurd to find fault with Mr. Dawson for not having foreseen the war as it would be to censure a geologist for failing to predict the occurrence of an earthquake. The great *débâcle* in no way affects the truth of his conclusions, which are based upon severe analysis and thorough research. His book is perhaps the best modern treatise in English upon Germany as a whole, and especially as an instance of economic development. It is a work unusual both for depth of thought and breadth of view; it is well proportioned, not too long, and as readable as the nature of the subject-matter, which necessarily includes a great mass of statistics, permits. The topics discussed embrace foreign trade and shipping, capital and labor, state enterprises, agriculture and industry, the population question, colonies, German socialism, and the Polish question.

To begin with, Mr. Dawson warns us against the common error of confusing Germany with Prussia. Both politically and socially the north of Germany differs markedly from the south. The "three-class system" of elections, the scientifically rigid, bureaucratic administration, the reactionary education laws, anti-coalition laws, Polish colonization laws—these and the corresponding tone of severity in social life are characteristically Prussian, not German. The southern states, inferior as they are to Prussia in material wealth and advancement, in the capability of their internal administrations, and in efficiency of military discipline, surpass her to an equal degree in political thought and institutions. And in the south one finds a corresponding difference in the character of the people; instead of austerity, the prevailing spirit is one of *Gemüthlichkeit*. "No one," remarks the author, would ever imagine a North German to be *gemüthlich*, and no one would ever imagine a South German to be anything else." Then, too, in the north itself there is a sharp distinction between the industrial west, where are found at their busiest most of the industries to which Germany owes its modern wealth, and the agricultural east, divided into large estates, lacking any real self-government, and politically reactionary. This, by way of introduction to a discussion that is after all topical rather than territorial in plan.

To an Englishman no question could well be more interesting than that concerning the causes of German success in competition with English trade. Mr. Dawson finds several interesting reasons for this success, reasons which have as much to do with method and national temper as with economic

conditions. In the first place, the fact should not be overlooked that Germany is "still in the first generation of its great industrialists," and is drawing upon unexhausted resources. Further, the less pretentious style of living that prevails in Germany as compared with other countries tends to lower the cost of production, though in later years the cost of living has advanced there as elsewhere. In scientific method, too, and in the adaptation of inventions and newly discovered processes the German industrialist has been far more progressive than his English rival. He early recognized the business value of chemistry, the neglect of which has inflicted upon English industry an irreparable loss. Finally, the personal equation counts enormously. The German merchant has always studied the needs of his customers and striven to give them exactly what they demanded. He has wooed trade through personal representation rather than by post, and he has devoted himself to his business with a single-minded earnestness. "In Germany trade is a passion. There is no disposition to be ashamed of it or to give it a secondary place; it is not an incident in a man's life, a variant on pleasure and sport, but the chief, primary, absorbing concern."

In Germany's economic development the principle of public enterprise has undoubtedly assisted in a pre-eminent degree—this is a point which Mr. Dawson makes emphatic. "Germany," he says pointedly, "is supposed to be a nation of theorists, England a land of practical men; yet the doctrinarianism which made a fetish of individualism originated in the land of practical men; the land of theorists accepted both individualism and socialization just for what they are intrinsically worth, and made an idol of neither." One benefit that has resulted from this frame of mind has been the enormous improvement that has taken place in the German railways since their nationalization, an improvement probably due more to the efficient and uniform management exercised by state officials than to any other cause. Very likely, the author admits, this may have little direct bearing upon the question of public or private ownership of railways in other lands; but by the same token it is fallacious to attribute to the state railway system censurable peculiarities which have their true explanation in German characteristics.

Between capital and labor the relationship is one of extreme tension, and in some cases of extreme bitterness. On the one hand there are syndicates, more law-abiding perhaps than our trusts, but hardly less powerful; on the other hand there are labor-unions which are just learning their power. In late years these unions have materially advanced the cause of the working-man in spite of laws against combination which have proved, indeed, less severe in practice than their letter would lead one to expect. The unions have been helped by a labor press which is said to shine by contrast with most cheap German publications. It is interesting to note, too, that socialism is fast losing its hold upon the German workman. Its whole theory has been weakened by the growth of a prosperous middle class, whose existence demonstrates the untruth of the notion that the poor must ever become poorer and the rich richer. Recently the Socialist party has shown a disposition to co-operate with other groups equally interested in the welfare of the people.

Those conditions which have brought about in Germany, within the last twenty or twenty-five years, a conflict between agriculture and industry more acute than in most other countries afford an interesting study, depending upon a multitude of interlocked facts which cannot well be under-

stood apart from the close and many-sided relationship in which the author has placed them. The upshot of the matter is that agrarian interests really require some sort of protection; the policy of *laissez faire* cannot stand. On this principle all parties are practically agreed, differing only as to means and degree. The associated problem of the scarcity of rural labor would certainly be more easy of solution if it were not for the obstinate unprogressiveness of the large landholders. The smaller farmers have strongly evinced the ancient German disposition to combine for mutual benefit. Indeed, the co-operative societies, both agricultural and industrial, have grown to such an extent that their members constitute at the lowest estimate one-fifteenth of the whole population.

That Germany in later years has had reason to be concerned over a declining birth-rate is perhaps not generally understood; yet the statistics show that since 1876 the decline has been steady. The highest figure before the war in 1870 was 38 per 1,000; in 1876 a maximum of 41 was reached; but by 1905 the rate had sunk to 33. Though the effect of this notable diminution in the percentage of births has been largely offset by a concurrent decrease in the general death-rate, infant mortality has given cause for alarm. To this latter problem the German Government has applied itself with energy and success, wisely endeavoring to deal with the population question in the cradle. Infant dispensaries, public regulation of the milk-supply, care for children of illegitimate birth, the protection of mothers, child-labor laws—these, with other direct and thorough remedies, have more than justified themselves. Yet success in this direction has made the other phase of the population problem all the more urgent; and when we come to examine the most obvious remedy—colonies—we find the impression confirmed that the German is a bad colonizer. Except, perhaps, in trade he has always been less happy in his dealings with men than with material things, and his ineptitude in the latter respect finds an illustration near home in his difficulties with the Poles. For years Germany has been trying to make good Poles into bad Germans, with the result that the Poles are irreconcilable. Similarly in dealing with peoples across the sea Germany has proved less apt than England or France. Moreover, the best territories for colonization have been pre-empted. As some one pithily said, Germany's healthy colonies are unfertile, and the fertile ones are unhealthy.

The price of imperialism as a whole is enormous, and the singular condition exists that while every party except the Social Democrats calls for an imperialistic policy, all with equal fervor complain of the cost. The Empire plainly needs more revenue, and there has been much embittered discussion over the question of direct *versus* indirect taxation. However, in spite of complaints and alarming figures, the country is (or was!) quite capable of supporting the burdens of imperialism. "The simple fact is," writes Mr. Dawson, "that the nation has committed itself to foreign undertakings and responsibilities without counting the cost; these enterprises are taxing its resources far beyond the measure to which it has become accustomed, and the outcry which has arisen is for the most part the outcry of the unthinking crowd, which always refuses to connect causes with effects or effects with causes."

On its interpretative side Mr. Dawson's book is illuminating to the general reader, while the well-ordered and definite facts which form the substratum of the work have scientific value of their own.